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Abstract: This paper links employment dynamics to the business cycle in order to examine the voluntary 
nature of self-employment in Argentina. Our results suggest that the transition to self-employment is more 
common during recessions and that the likelihood of becoming self-employed increases with the length of 
the recession and the unemployment duration. We find that the majority of self-employed workers do not 
have employees and earn significantly less than salaried workers. Individuals in this sector are often 
young and less educated and have trouble obtaining a salaried position regardless of the macroeconomic 
conditions. Middle-aged, college-educated individuals also tend to enter self-employment as a temporary 
refuge when they encounter difficulties during a recession. Our results suggest, however, that for 
entrepreneurs who have employees, entry into self-employment is procyclical and voluntary and has 
characteristics similar to those predicted for highly skilled risk-taking entrepreneurs. Including 
idiosyncratic entrepreneurial abilities in a standard job search model allows us to predict such labor 
market segmentation and the cyclical pattern of entrance into self-employment. 
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Mounted on the success of the Silicon Valley high-tech start-ups, the view of self-employment in in-
dustrialized countries is remarkably positive. Self-employed workers are generally regarded as creative
a n dh i g hq u a l i ﬁed individuals who have abandoned the comfort of salaried positions to invent new
products, production process and distribution methods. The sector is dynamic and populated by “su-
perstars” that obtain outstanding proﬁts and social inﬂuence, bringing vitality to the economy and
decisively contributing to its expansion.1 In response to this view, many countries have been devel-
oping supportive policies to stimulate these self-started projects.2 Such optimism ﬁnds support in the
bulk of the theoretical literature and empirical evidence on the matter.3 Although some studies show
that small business owners register lower median earnings growth than those in paid employment, such
gap is not considered to be the result of low-ability selection bias, rather the result of non-pecuniary
beneﬁts, such as “being your own boss.”4 To sum up, a growing strand of the literature considers
self-employment an optimal and voluntary decision.
Interestingly, we observe that the same conclusions are being attached to the microenterprise sector
in the developing world, where it comprises a large fraction of the working population. Despite the
scarcity of studies in this region, an emerging perspective in the academic literature stresses the micro-
entrepreneurial dynamism, voluntary entry and job satisfaction. In broad terms, these studies attempt
to show that microenterprises in emerging economies (particularly in middle-income countries) show
1Rosen (1981) discusses the “superstar” theory.
2See Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1998).
3For a survey on the literature see Blanchﬂower (2004). Classic contributions include: Lucas (1978), where individuals
are endowed with a given and known entrepreneurial ability. Those with a suﬃciently high level of managerial ability
become entrepreneurs, while the rest become wage workers. Jovanovic (1982) adds dynamic and uncertainty about these
skills. Evans (1987) describes industrial dynamics that permit a characterization of microﬁrms. Rees and Sha (1986)
argue that more educated individuals have a lower cost of assessing business opportunities and that human capital is a
complement to managerial abilities.
4See Hamilton (2000).
1dynamic patterns consistent with the entrepreneurial risk-taking framework in the industrial world.5
They conclude that such strong similarities suggest that mainstream models could be useful guides for
policymaking in the existing developing-country microenterprise sector.6
To put it bluntly, the objective of this paper is to answer a key question that would guide policy-
makers: Is the above description an appropriate characterization of self-employment, or is it more
accurately explained by the traditional economic development literature that views this sector as being
stagnant, serving merely as a refuge of last resort for the urban unemployed?7Given that resources are
scarce, governments and multilateral organizations may face a trade-oﬀ between devoting resources to
support entrepreneurial activities or spending them elsewhere, for instance, to promote education and
training.
We analyze the labor market in Argentina, a middle-income country that has a sizeable self-
employment sector, and track individuals in the period 1995-2003. Our comprehensive data set is
unique in the sense that contains a rotating household panel survey that is suitable to perform a
comparison with ﬁrm dynamics in developed economies. The study relies on probit and multinomial
logistic models. In addition, we propose an innovative approach that links employment transition
dynamics vis-à-vis to the business cycle. It is important to mention that during such a short period
of time, the economy witnessed a remarkable variety of macroeconomic scenarios: Namely, a short-
lived recession, a two-year period of extraordinarily high economic growth, a long-lasting economic
depression followed by a dramatic economic crisis, and a recovery. This sizable business cycle is used
to judge the voluntary nature of employment transitions in terms of what have been called the “push”
and “pull” factors of the labor supply. To characterize the “push” factors, consider a depressive
context with high unemployment levels and no business opportunities; such scenario allows us to link
self-employment transitions to employment of last resort or disguised unemployment. To the contrary,
“pull” factors play a role when macroeconomic conditions are good. The prospects for business are
5This literature have roots in Hart (1972). Examples include: De Soto (1989), Maloney (1999, 2004), Battacharya
(2002), Fajnzylber et al (2006) and Ñopo and Valenzuela (2007).
6See Fajnzylber et al (2006).
7These views have roots in Harris and Torado (1970). The labor market is segmented by wage settings in the formal
sector that leaves the urban unemployed rationed out of the modern salaried employment, forcing them to remain
informal and search for a refuge in the self-employment sector. Rauch (1991) model endogenously determines the choice
between formal and informal sector.
2better and qualiﬁed individuals with entrepreneurial abilities may voluntarily choose to become self-
employed, knowing that if the venture fails another job oﬀer will not be far away.8 We argue that
this “revealed” evidence is more appropriate than surveys that directly address the voluntary nature
of the transition. As shown in Blanchﬂower (2004), individuals tend to be unrealistically optimistic
when disclosing prospects about their own business projects.
In order to answer the questions posed above, we report the following key ﬁndings: (a) Conditional
on skill levels, self-employed workers earn on average 8.3 percent less than salaried workers and they
also have 1.9 percent less income growth.(b) Economic recessions are associated with a monotonic
increase in the amount of individuals (salaried and unemployed) that transition to self-employment.
However, this trend sharply reverts when the economy starts growing (the lowest transition point
is at the peak of the macroeconomic activity). (c) Recessions improve the performance of salaried
workers, putting into question the voluntary nature of such transition.9(d) Years of economic booms
are characterized by less educated individuals with few entrepreneurial skills becoming self-employed,
and more educated self-employed individuals becoming salaried workers. This trend reverts when the
recession begins. Therefore, when the economy is performing well, self-employment is only a proﬁtable
alternative for those low educated individuals who are unable to ﬁnd a job in the salaried sector. As
the recession hits, it expands the pool of workers looking for a job, and it increases the likelihood of
more educated individuals (particularly middle-age college educated individuals) starting their own
micro-businesses.(e) When the recession deepens, and average unemployment duration increases, the
proportion of unemployed workers that move to self-employment drastically rises. Besides, a successful
transition to a salaried position is less likely if the unemployment spell is long. (f) On average, workers
in larger ﬁrms and with higher salaries are less likely to start an entrepreneurial activity. A preliminary
conclusion is clear: self-employment is unlikely to be the result of an optimal and voluntary decision
taken by high-skilled individuals. Instead, it should be regarded as a refuge for the urban unemployed.
Earle and Sakova (2000) reject the pooling of own-account workers and self-employed individuals
that also have their own employees since their intrinsic characteristics are diﬀerent. We ﬁnd a striking
8For details and related literature see Carrasco (1999).
9Since the reverse cyclical conclusion does not apply, we discard that this fact is simply the result of nominal wage
rigidities.
3segmentation when we take this distinction into account. Contrary to the general conclusions above,
results indicate that: (g) recessions are associated with a decline in the proportion of individuals
that become self-employed with employees. (h) The probability of becoming an entrepreneur with
employees monotonically increases in both education and age. (i) People that are currently employed
and with higher conditional salaries are more likely to transition into this category. In other words,
only when we focus in this category do we ﬁnd patterns that are similar to the optimistic view discussed
above. The evidence supports the existence of experienced and talented individuals who were able to
accumulate enough capital and managerial abilities to start their own business projects and generate
employment. Nonetheless, this phenomenon is very limited in nature: Two-thirds of the self-employed
are actually own-account workers, and if they manage to survive, they will most likely remain within
this category. Moreover, the self-employment sector in developing countries is much larger than those
that exist in the developed world.
We show that the employment dynamics above mayb ec a p t u r e db ya ne x t e n d e dj o bs e a r c hm o d e l
that includes idiosyncratic entrepreneurial abilities and business cycle properties. This model leads
to a labor market that is clearly segmented. Those with extraordinary entrepreneurial abilities (pure
entrepreneurs), or the remarkably low-qualiﬁed individuals with little chance to ﬁnd employment in
the job market (misﬁts) may choose to be self-employed on a permanent basis. Other workers may
face serious diﬃculties ﬁnding paid jobs during recessions and may regard self-employment as a safe
refuge while searching for a proper salaried position.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section
3 shows descriptive statistics. Section 4 discusses the employment transition dynamics. The micro-
econometric analysis is presented in section 5. Concluding remarks are in section 6.
2M o d e l
In order to analyze employment transition and business cycle properties, we consider an extension
of the classic intertemporal job search model (McCall, 1970). The key contribution of our model is
the inclusion of idiosyncratic entrepreneurial abilities and business cycle properties that result in a
4segmentation of the labor market.
Model Setup Consider an individual who is searching for a job. The model is stochastic, in
the sense that each period the worker draws, with no cost, one oﬀer w(θi) from what she perceives
(with complete certainty) to be her idiosyncratic wage cumulative distribution F(W(θi)) = Fθi =
prob{w ≤ W}, with Fθi(0) = 0,F θi(Ω)=1for Ω(θi) < ∞. Here θi captures intrinsic work ability
(human capital) and entrepreneurial skills for the individual under consideration.
Every period the worker has the option of rejecting the job oﬀer, in which case she receives unem-
ployment compensation z(θi), such that Ω >z (θi) > 0, and waits until the next period to draw another
oﬀer from Fθi. We assume that the unemployed worker can not receive this temporary compensation
for more than τ consecutive periods. The individual may also become self-employed while searching
for a salaried position. In this case the individual gets c(θi) and no unemployment compensation. Of
course, at any time the individual can stop looking for a job and become self-employed on a permanent
basis with same compensation c(θi).10
Alternatively, the worker can accept the oﬀer to work at w, in which case she receives a wage w per
period thereafter. During her “living” tenure neither quitting nor being ﬁred is permitted. Nonetheless,
each period the worker faces a ﬁxed probability of surviving α ∈ (0,1) with her idiosyncratic status
θi. That is, the “death” of the individual should be interpreted as a change in her intrinsic ability.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that individuals maximize only over their “living” tenure (as
in Sargent and Ljungqvist, 2000), and that the “death” shock occurs independently of the original
idiosyncratic status θi. After “dying”, the individual is “reborn” and draws a new θj status with a
new wage distribution F(W(θj)) = Fθj, a n dt h u sp r o c e e dw i t han e wr e o p t i m i z a t i o na n dj o bs e a r c h .
Optimization Let yt be the worker’s income in period t. We ﬁnd three possible scenarios: we
have that yt = w if the worker has accepted an oﬀer to work at wage w. If the unemployment spell
is no longer than τ, and z(θi) > c(θi) the worker’s income is: yt = z(θi), otherwise she derives her
10In c(θi), we may include non-pecuniary beneﬁts, such as “being your own boss.”
5income from self employment, yt = c(θi).11
The unemployed worker devises a strategy to maximize EΣ∞
s=t(βα)s−tys. Where 0 <β<1 is a
discount factor adjusted for her survival rate α. Let νθi(w) be the expected value of EΣ∞
s=t(βα)s−tys,
for a worker who has an oﬀer w in hand, who is deciding whether to accept or reject it and behaves



























Where the maximization is over three options: (1) accept the wage oﬀer w and work at wage w
during the living tenure; (2) reject the oﬀer and draw a new oﬀer w0 from distribution Fθi. In the
meantime, receiving either unemployment compensation, z(θi), or being temporarily self-employed
and earning c(θi); (3) or becoming permanently self-employed and receiving c(θi). The solution will
be of the form:
νθi(w)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
I(θi)+βα
R Ω(θi)
0 νθi(w0)dFθi(w0) if w 6 ¯ w(θi)
¯ w(θi)
1−βα if w > ¯ w(θi)
c(θi)
1−βα if c(θi) > Ω(θi)
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
(3)
Where ¯ w(θi) is the reservation wage and I(θi) is a function that takes the value z(θi) if t 6 τ
and z(θi) > c(θi), and c(θi) otherwise. Since the individual can draw a new oﬀer at no cost, and
11The standard search model assumes that leisure does not provide any utility to the individual. If z(θi)=c(θi), the
unemployment and self-employment compensation are identical. We assume that in such scenario the individual prefers
to remain unemployed.
6always have the possibility of being self-employed while waiting for the right job, we easily deduce
that only those who earn a self-employment income, c(θi), higher than any other possible job oﬀer
(i.e. c(θi) > Ω(θi)), will stop looking for a paid job and become permanently self-employed.
Let us now focus on those who search for a wage earning position. Using equation (3) we can
convert the functional equation (2) into an ordinary mapping, νθi(¯ w), in the reservation wage ¯ w(θi).
Evaluating νθi(¯ w), and using equation (3), we have:





(w0 − ¯ w(θi))dF θi(w0) (4)
Equation (4) is used in the job search literature to characterize the determination of the reservation
wage ¯ w. The left side is the cost of searching one more time when an oﬀer ¯ w is in hand. The right side
is the expected beneﬁto fs e a r c h i n go n em o r et i m ei nt e r m so ft h ee x p e c t e dp r e s e n tv a l u ea s s o c i a t e d
with drawing w0 > ¯ w. Equation (4) informs the worker to set ¯ w so that the cost of searching one more






(w0 − ¯ w(θi))dFθi(w0) (5)











(Fθi)0 > 0 (7)
12We apply Leibniz’ rule to compute u0(w(θi)). Let Θ(ζ)=
U γ(ζ)
δ(ζ) f(x,ζ)dx for ζ [c,d]. Assume that f and
∂f
∂ζ




∂ζ(x,ζ)dx. Let w(θi) play the role of ζ when applying this formula.
7So that u(w(θi)) is convex to the origin. Given the idiosyncratic work ability and entrepreneurial
skills, θi, we can graph u(w(θi)) against w(θi) to determine ¯ w(θi) and characterize the labor market
segmentation. Refer to Figure 1 for an example.
Business Cycle Properties To make matters interesting, we include a business cycle analysis in
this simple setup. We rely on the classic “misperception” business cycle theory in which the factor that
inﬂuences workers’ decision is the misperception of real wages (Lucas, 1973). For example, assume that
the general level of prices, including the level of nominal wages, increases as a result of an unexpected
monetary expansion. In principle, real variables should remain unaﬀected given the assumption that
money supply is neutral. However, workers mistakenly perceive the increment in nominal wages as
an increment in the real level of wages that are being oﬀered in the job market. More jobs oﬀers are
accepted, and therefore individuals work and produce more. Inverse results would follow a monetary
contraction (that in emerging economies could be the result of capital outﬂows).13
Consequently, in the boundaries of our simple setup, an economic expansion is a situation in which
actual wage draws are on average higher than the ones workers had expected to obtain. Now, let us say
that the actual idiosyncratic wage cumulative distribution is deﬁned as follows: FA(W(θi)) = F
θi
A =
prob{w ≤ W}, with F
θi
A (0) = 0,F
θi
A (ΩA)=1for ΩA(θi) < ∞. In any period t, the misperception that
deﬁnes an economic expansion is such that: ΩA(θi) > Ω(θi), and F
θi
A <F θi, so that EA >E w (θi).
Where Ew(θi) is the average wage oﬀer expected by the individual and EA is the mean value of the
actual wage distribution. To the contrary, during an economic recession such misperception works in
t h eo p p o s i t ed i r e c t i o n :ΩA(θi) < Ω(θi), F
θi
A >Fθi, with EA <E w (θi).
Following this line of argument, we may distinguish a situation in which workers’ misperceptions are
more severe and thus the recession is deeper. If we deﬁne the wage distribution during a pronounced
recession as F
θi




A >F θi with ΩA(deep)(θi) < ΩA(θi) <





A <F θi with ΩA(boom)(θi) > ΩA(θi) > Ω(θi).
13There are alternative ways to model this misperception and get the same results. Assume, for instance, that each
worker obtains a wage oﬀer with a given probability each period (See Mortensen, 1986, for details). If the worker believes
that in every period such probability is equal to λw; recessions (booms) are going to be characterized for a situation in
which the actual probability of receiving an oﬀer, λa, is such that, λa <λ w (λa >λ w).
82.1 Labor Market Segmentation
Given idiosyncratic ability and skills, this labor market characterization allows us to segment the
market in three diﬀerent sectors: Salaried workers, Pure Entrepreneurs and Misﬁts.
Salaried Workers “Salaried Workers” are those individuals who are either employed (and re-
ceive wage compensation), or are looking for a permanent salaried position. Figure 1 indicates the




w (w0 − ¯ w(θi))dFθi(w0)=u(w(θi)).
From this analysis we can derive some intuitive theoretical results. First, if the unemployment
compensation, z(θi), is smaller than the income the worker can derive from self-employment, c(θi),
the worker will regard self-employment as a “temporary refuge” while looking for paid employment
that satisﬁes her reservation wage.
Second, assume that the economy is in a recession and z(θi) > c(θi). I ne q u a t i o n( 3 )w es h o w
how the reservation wage, ¯ w(θi), is derived from the individual perceptions. We also know that a
recession is characterized by an idiosyncratic distribution in which actual wage draws are (on average)
lower than the workers’ expectations. Therefore, it is more likely for the worker to obtain draws that
are below her reservation wage (i.e. F
θi
A (¯ w(θi)) >F θi(¯ w(θi))); and consequently the search process
and unemployment duration are longer on average. To sum up, in aggregate terms, the number of
individuals who remain unemployed for more than τ consecutive periods and are forced to seek self-
employment as a temporary refuge (while searching for a salaried position) increases during recessions.
The deeper and longer the recession is, the larger the amount of individuals in this situation.
Pure Entrepreneurs “Pure Entrepreneurs” are highly qualiﬁed individuals with exceptional
entrepreneurial abilities who perceive that the income they may obtain from self-employment, c(θi) is
at least as high as any other possible wage oﬀer they may obtain in the job market (i.e. c(θi) > Ω(θi)).
Although they may face attractive job oﬀers, they never look for a salaried position.14 Refer to Figure
14This model might be easily extended to capture some other intuitive results. For instance, economic expansions are
associated with productivity innovations and technological improvements that result in new niches for proﬁtable business
startups. As a result, business entry is procyclical (see Bilbiie et al, 2006, for references). In our model terminology, we
could interpret that economic expansions are linked to periods in which the proportion of “newborns” z with exceptional
abilities (i.e. c(θz) > Ω(θz) ∀z) is higher.
93.
Misﬁts “Misﬁts” are individuals who are severely disadvantaged in the labor market, as for
example, young, inexperienced individuals with no formal education. Even though the income they
c a ne a r nf r o ml o w - q u a l i ﬁed self-employment, c(θi), is very low, they realize that job oﬀers they could
get are negligible in value. As a result, the same condition (i.e. c(θi) > Ω(θi)) applies. Figure 4 plots
this category.
3 Descriptive Statistics and Employment Dynamics.
We use the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH), an urban household survey tracking individuals
for 2 years, both in May and August, from 1995 to 2003.15 The survey covers most Argentinean
metropolitan areas and is one of the most representative databases of urban employment available of
this frequency in Latin America. As usual, we only consider individuals in the age range 20-65, which
comprise the active labor force (in Argentina, retirement age is between 60 and 65, although slightly
lower for public employees).
T a b l e1p r e s e n t sb a s i cs t a t i s t i c sf o rt h ep o o l e dE P Hs a m p l e . S o m es t y l i z e df a c t se m e r g ef r o m
the table. On average 27 percent of the labor force is self-employed, which is a relatively large
number. For instance, self-employment compasses only 6 percent of the urban employment in the
United States.16 The individuals in this sector are relatively older and less educated than salaried
workers. We also observe a high dispersion and heavy tails, meaning that we encounter both very
unskilled and professionals in this category. Average income of the self-employed is 20 percent greater
than that of salaried workers. However, when controlling for observable skills, salaried workers earn on
average 8.3 percent more than self-employed.17 Entrepreneurs have an average annual hourly income
growth of -4.8 percent which contrast with -1.9 percent of salaried workers. This diﬀerence is also
15However, since we will be mostly interested in annual transition and income dynamics, our sample will be reduced
to May 1995-May 2002.
16See Blanchﬂower (2004).
17We run a regression where the dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly wage and we use a dummy variable for
salaried as an independent variable, controlling for years of schooling, age, gender, an indicator for household head, and
year and regional dummies. Regression coeﬃcients are not reported but are available upon request.
10robust to additional controls, showing an average income growth diﬀerence of 1.9 percent.18 Finally,
household heads and males are more likely to be self-employed.
Table 2 shows the distribution of workers in each sector by ﬁrm size. Notice that about two-thirds
of the self-employed are own-account workers. Table 3 presents the distribution of workers in each
sector by industry. In particular, we note that about 50 percent of the self-employed are in three main
sectors: retail trade, construction and repair services.
In order to have a sense of how many individuals change from one status to another, we compute
the dynamics of moving in or out the self-employment sector. In Table 4.a we present transition
dynamics from three sectors: self-employment, salaried and unemployment. For simplicity we exclude
individuals not in the labor force. We observe that about 71 percent of self-employed workers stay
in that sector, while roughly 20 percent go to (and come from) the salaried sector. The remaining
9 percent transit to (and from) unemployment. The salaried sector shows the least mobility among
the three sectors - around 85 percent of workers stay from one year to the next. Also note that self-
employed workers are 50 percent more likely to be unemployed one year later than salaried workers.
Finally, it is worth noting that of those workers who begin as unemployed, around 40 percent of them
is absorbed by the salaried sector, this is about twice as many individuals as the self-employed sector
absorbs. Nonetheless, if we acknowledge the relative size of each sector, the unemployed who move
to the salaried sector represent 6 percent of salaried workers while the unemployed absorbed by the
self-employed represent for 13 percent of self-employed. Table 4.b shows ﬁrm size dynamics for those
that start and end up as self-employed. The vast majority (around 82 percent) of the own-account
workers who manage to survive remain in this category and do not hire employees. Those who start
with at least with one employee most likely remain with employees. The more employees the ﬁrm
posseses, the lower the possibility the employer has of becoming an own-account worker. Similarly,
the likelihood of hiring additional employees is monotonically related with the size of the ﬁrm. For
instance only 4.9 percent of ﬁrms with 1 to 4 employees expand, while 21.5 percent of ﬁrms with 15
to 24 employees move to the category that comprises ﬁr m sw i t hm o r et h a n2 5e m p l o y e e s .
18Here the dependent variable is the annual hourly income growth rate, and we use the same controls as before.
Regression coeﬃcients are not reported but are available on request.
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Figure 5 reports the evolution of real gross domestic product (GDP) and unemployment rate in Ar-
gentina for the years 1994-2003. Although this is a short period of time, the variety of macroeconomic
scenarios and the size of the business cycle contribute to make this study more appealing. The Mexican
economic crisis is to certain extent inherited by Argentina (process known as the Tequila eﬀect), and
the economy witnesses a short-lived recession during 1995. Thereafter, the economy recovers strongly
until 1998 (GDP growth of 8 percent in 1997). Following the successive negative shocks from East
Asia, Russia and Brazil; Argentina enters into a long-lasting recession at the end of 1998 (with GDP
falling 3 percent). Meanwhile, the issue of Argentina’s massive public debt becomes a subject of
considerable controversy, capital outﬂight increases, and soon the government ﬁnds itself unable to
meet debt payments. The chaotic crisis explodes after an almost complete freezing of bank deposits
at the end of 2001. In 2002, Argentina’s GDP sinks by 10.9 percent with respect to the previous year.
The economy ﬁnally recuperates in 2003. Unemployment falls when the Tequila eﬀect is over, but
signiﬁcantly increases during the four-year recession that follows. The crash of the economy in 2001
brings a clear spike in the jobless rate.
Figure 6 depicts the evolution of hourly wages for the period 1995-2003 both in levels and in annual
diﬀerences (left scale and right scale respectively). The ﬁgure shows a context of deterioration of real
wages and a 30 percent fall in average hourly wages in the aftermath of the 2001 economic crisis. The
evolution of total self-employment and own-account rates as a proportion of the total active labor force
is shown in Figure 7. First, notice that total self-employment signiﬁcantly increases after the Tequila
eﬀect. Thereafter, own-account employment participation in total self-employment is countercyclical.
When the economy expands, overall self-employment increases, but the own-account sector is almost
non-reactive. The situation changes when the recession begins in 1998. During this period, the growth
rate of own-account employment surpasses the growth rate of aggregate self-employment, and the
growth rate gap continues to increase in the aftermath of the economic crisis.
Figure 8 represents the evolution of the salaried premium in levels (obtained as in the previous
subsection) over the period of analysis. Here we also distinguish between own-account workers and
12self-employed with employees. The ﬁgure shows that only the entrepreneurs with employees register a
positive income premium with respect to salaried workers. It also shows that the deterioration of the
economy improves the relative performance of the salaried workers. After controlling for several factors
in 2002, own-account workers make on average 20 percent less than salaried workers (in relative terms
and during 2002). One possible interpretation is to link this diﬀerence to nominal wage rigidities. The
reverse analysis does not hold however. During periods of economic expansions, only the self-employed
with employees experience an income improvement relative to salaried workers.
The timing and characteristics of those who change their labor status are informative about the
nature of these transitions. Figure 9 plots the mean years of schooling of those moving from salaried
to self-employment, as well as the proportion of salaried workers that make that transition. In years of
economic expansion (1996-1997), the amount of salaried workers that become self-employed decreases
to ﬁnally reach its lowest point at the peak of economic activity (red-dashed line). This trend reverts
at the start of the recession at the end of 1998.
Boom years are characterized by less educated individuals (on average) becoming self-employed
(blue-solid line). Nonetheless, this trend also reverts once the recession begins. In fact, the average
years of schooling for new self-employed reaches its maximum when the recessive outlook becomes
more pronounced. Figure 10 shows the reverse transition, i.e. from self-employment to salaried. In
this case, years of economic expansion are associated with the transition of individuals with more
education than in years of recession. These two patterns may be interpreted as follows: when the
economy is performing well, self-employment is only a proﬁtable alternative for those low educated
individuals who are unable to ﬁnd a job in the salaried sector. As the recession hits, it expands the pool
of workers looking for a job, and in particular it increases the likelihood of more educated individuals
starting their own micro-business.
To complete the analysis, in Figure 11 we consider the proportion and mean years of schooling
of those who transit from unemployment to self-employment. Similar conclusions arise. The pool of
workers that move to self-employment is signiﬁcantly more educated as the recession becomes more
severe. Additionally, we observe that one year after the recession starts, the proportion of unemployed
13workers that transition to self-employment rises dramatically to reach its peak during the economic
crisis.
Contrary to the conclusions above, a deeper recessi o ni sa s s o c i a t e dw i t had e c l i n ei nt h ea m o u n to f
unemployed or salaried workers that become self-employed with employees (See Figures 9 and 11). To
sum up, the cyclical pattern of own account workers and self-employed with employees signiﬁcantly
diﬀer.
It is reasonable to associate these employment transition dynamics with the predictions of our
theoretical speciﬁcation: “Misﬁts” may be associated with low-qualiﬁed own-account workers that
are permanently disadvantaged in the labor market, “salaried workers” may be linked to qualiﬁed
workers who might face diﬃculties to get salaried positions during recessions and regard own-account
positions as a “refuge” of last resort. Finally, self-employed with employees show a transition pattern
that resembles the “pure entrepreneurs” in the model setup.
5E c o n o m e t r i c A n a l y s i s
The employment transition dynamics resemble the labor market segmentation of the theoretical model.
Our econometric analysis aims to obtain a proper characterization the idiosyncratic component θi,t h a t
captures intrinsic work ability (human capital) and entrepreneurial skills. In principle, a structural
econometric model of this type could be identiﬁed if we had a sample of potential earnings in the self-
employment and salaried sectors for the individual’s entire life. However, the recursive structure of
the theoretical model is sympathetic to our data limitations. That is, its recursive nature implies that
the transition from one period to another follows a simple time homogenous Markov-chain. As shown
in Evans and Leighton (1989), labor status decisions can be analyzed in a Markov-chain structure,
where the last period variables contain all the information to fully describe the stochastic nature of
the transition. As in the theoretical model speciﬁcation, suppose that an individual i can choose to be
either: self-employed or salaried (denoted by e and s respectively). At any point in time t,t h ed e c i s i o n
to be in one of these labor categories is given by the net value of the discounted future earnings
described in (3).
14An empirical model for the earnings, yt, for any individual, i, in period t, could be deﬁned as:
yt(Lt,X t,Z t(Lt−1,L t−2,....),δθ,ε t,Lt). This function depends on the actual labor status, Lt, and ob-
servable human capital variables which maybe exogenous, Xt, or endogenous, Zt, being the latter
being path-dependent. Additionally, the component δθ captures non-observable entrepreneurial abil-
ity and intrinsic preferences for such status. Given our model speciﬁcation, the implicit Markov-chain
structure assumption allows us to estimate the following probability:
P [Lt = e|Lt−1,X t,Z t]=P [yt(e|Lt−1) − yt(s|Lt−1) > 0,L t−1,X t,Y t] (8)
May still be a correlation between Y and δθ. The identiﬁcation problem could be solved by the
inclusion of a proxy or instrumental variable. Unfortunately, employment surveys in developing coun-
tries do not contain potential instrumental variables that can be used in this context. Our strategy to
capture this unobserved ability is to use earnings in the previous year, t−1, as an indicator of whether
or not the transition from one sector to the other hada ni n t e r m e d i a t es t e pi nu n e m p l o y m e n t ,a n du n -
employment duration, which can be used as proxies that may aﬀect the individual decision to become
self-employed but are not captured in traditional human capital variables. Notice that including past
earnings does not pose a problem to the interpretation of the parameters, as binary outcome models
identify coeﬃcients up to scale parameter.19
Furthermore, we restrict the sample to those who start as unemployed and estimate a multinomial
model where the individual may remain unemployed, become salaried or become self-employed. We
then expand the entry model to a multinomial analysis disaggregating self-employment into own-
account workers and entrepreneurs with employees.
19We do not pursue identiﬁcation of the parameters in the earnings equation. If we assume that εt,e − εt,s is not
serially correlated, the endogeneity bias can be corrected.
155.1 Determinants of becoming self-employed
We ﬁrst study the determinants of entry in the entrepreneur sector using a probit model.20Initially,
the base population will be that of all salaried workers and the dependent variable will be constructed
as equal to 0 if the individual remains salaried one year later, and 1 if the individual becomes self-
employed (with or without employees). The set of explanatory variables includes education, age,
gender, a variable identifying household heads, ﬁrm size, a public sector employment dummy, last
period wage and a variable identifying those individuals who became unemployed within the survey
period.21 In addition, the regressions include several categorical variables (not presented in the table)
for industry, region and time.22 Only marginal eﬀects on the probability are reported.
In table 5, we present the results of two probit speciﬁcations: Column (2) diﬀers from column (1)
only in that it includes the interacted eﬀects between education and age in order to characterize how
diﬀerent combinations of these covariates aﬀect the probability of becoming self-employed. Following
Montes-Rojas and Siga (2007), the goal is to produce a model that is ﬂexible enough to identify the
locus of age-education that deﬁnes a labor market segmentation.
In Figure 12.a, we graphically present the estimated eﬀects of combinations of age and education
from speciﬁcation (2). It shows two main important areas where it is more likely to ﬁnd new self-
employed: the area with young workers with low educational attainment, and the area that comprises
individuals with superior education in the 40-55 age range. For any age group, the eﬀect of formal
education on the probability of becoming an entrepreneur is concave. Therefore the level of education
that minimizes the probability of a salaried worker becoming an entrepreneur roughly corresponds to
the completion of secondary school. This pattern is similar to Fajnzylber et al.’s (2006) ﬁndings in
Mexico and another study for Argentina by Montes-Rojas and Siga (2007).
Regarding the eﬀect of age on the likelihood of becoming self-employed, we ﬁnd that individuals
20Since the logit speciﬁcation provided outcomes identical outcomes to the probit model, we choose not to report it.
21Although it would be desirable to capture all the individuals who became unemployed at any point during the year,
the survey only allows us to identify those unemployed at the moment of the survey in between our analyzed periods
(August) leaving out those who temporarily became unemployed before or after that survey. Besides, the EPH does not
provide any information about the reason for being unemployed.
22Individual’s ﬁnancial situation and wealth are not available in our data set. In the liquidity constraints literature (see
Evans and Jovanovic, 1989, for instance) these variables play an important role in the propensity to be an entrepreneur.
Therefore, in our context, the age proﬁle should not be interpreted only as experience in the Mincerian sense, but as a
proxy for both experience and past ﬁnancial accumulation.
16with no education will ﬁnd the self-employment sector less attractive as they become older. One
possible interpretation that young and inexperienced individuals with little education face diﬃculties
ﬁnding salaried positions in the urban job market (i.e. they are usually regarded as misﬁts). They are
willing to take risks, and learning by doing, they try to acquire low-level entrepreneurial skills. Things
become diﬀerent as these individuals become older and achieve some level of specialization in their
jobs although they often ﬁnd it diﬃcult to accumulate enough capital to engage in entrepreneurship
activities. Most likely this type of workers obtained very speciﬁc skills (i.e. manual jobs) but not
entrepreneurial abilities while employed. Entering self-employment becomes riskier for these workers
as they age in the sense that they have less time to learn and develop entrepreneurial skills as they
near retirement.
This pattern is diﬀerent for higher levels of education as the shape of the curve reverses. For
those individuals with a college education, those in their middle age have the highest probability
of becoming self-employed.23 We consider two hypotheses for this situation. Firstly, such result is
compatible with a dynamic entrepreneurial sector in which successful individuals accumulate enough
capital and experience to later try starting their own business. For instance, Fajnzylber et al. (2006)
obtain similar ﬁndings for Mexico and reach a similar conclusion. The transition dynamics discussed
in the previous section, along with the stylized characteristics of middle-income countries, lead us
to contemplate a less optimistic hypothesis. Namely, middle-age college educated individuals who
lose their jobs in the public or private sector usually face serious diﬃculties to obtaining a position
with similar earnings and beneﬁts. This phenomenon is more evident during long recessions. In this
sense, the ﬁndings described in Figure 9 to 11 clearly support this hypothesis. The threat of long
unemployment spells create an incentive to start own-account projects which are not capital intensive
and basically consist of providing services somewhat related to the academic training of the individual.
In developing countries, as shown in Beccaria and Lopez (1996), college educated individuals usually
develop profound social networks. In this scenario, part-time consultation and professional advice is
regarded as safe refuge in economies in which unemployment insurance is not widely available.
23Similarly, Carrasco (1999) and Moore and Mueller’s (2002) research on Spain and Canada respectively show that
the hazard of becoming self-employed has a maximum for middle-aged individuals ( 35-45 years old for Spain, 45-54
years old for Canada).
17Consistent with this view is the eﬀect of the variable Lost Job in Table 5, which captures those
individuals who involuntarily left the salaried sector. Those individuals rationed out of the salaried
employment are more likely to choose to start a micro-ﬁrm because they may not be able to ﬁnd a
good salaried position. Furthermore, the wage variable shows the expected negative impact on the
likelihood of moving, as, ceteris paribus, higher wages make individuals less interested in leaving the
salaried sector. We also include ﬁrm size dummy variables to test whether individuals in any particular
type of ﬁrm are more likely to start a micro-ﬁrm. As observed in Table 5, as the ﬁrm size increases, the
probability of moving to the self-employment sector decreases. This is probably due to non-pecuniary
beneﬁts oﬀered by larger ﬁrms. Besides, sizeable ﬁrms usually oﬀer higher salaries and employment
stability. Finally, public administration workers are less inclined to move to the self-employment sector,
likely a consequence of the greater job security they have in comparison to jobs in the private sector.
This suggests us that those who move to the self-employment sector come from the worse salaried
jobs.
The next step is to study the entry pattern of those individuals who are unemployed in order
to check whether the patterns of entry found in the salaried population are also observed for the
unemployed. In Table 6, we present results for a multinomial logit speciﬁcation where the dependent
variable takes the value 0 if an unemployed remains in that condition from one year to the next, or
1 if he moves to the self-employed sector, or 2 if he becomes salaried. In ﬁgure 12.b, we plot the
estimated eﬀects of combination of age and education.24 The left panel focuses on those individuals
that move into self employment, while the right panel focuses on those who take salaried positions.
If we concentrate on young individuals we ﬁnd a clear pattern: those who are college educated have
a higher likelihood of obtaining a salaried position in the job market, while those with little (or
no) formal education are the ones most likely to become self-employed. The right panel also shows
that the likelihood of getting a salaried position monotonically decreases as the individual gets older.
Middle-aged unemployed individuals with superior education, however, are more likely to become
24Here we follow Carrasco’s (1999) speciﬁcation. The multinomial models suﬀers from the know problem of indepen-
dent of irrelevant alternatives. Unfortunately, taking into consideration the segmentation of the labor market implied
in the search model, no nested logit alternative model can be used. The results of this section are only used to ﬁnd the
covariates value that describes that characterization.
18self-employed once again (left panel).
In Figure 13 we graphically present the eﬀect of unemployment duration on the probability of
becoming self-employed. Similar to the theoretical predictions, the regression coeﬃcients imply that
unemployment spells that are very long are more likely to culminate in self-employment.
Income Growth If self-employment is truly a tactic of last resort, individuals that become self-
employed should face some income loss. In Table 7, we regress annual income growth for all individuals
who are employed both years, controlling for the same set of individual characteristics used above, and
including a set of dummy variables for whether the individual is salaried or self-employed , and for
the nature of the transition if any (i.e. salaried to self-employed, self-employed to salaried). It can be
observed that on average salaried workers have higher income growth than self-employed workers with
t h es a m es k i l ll e v e l .M o r e o v e r ,t h o s ew h om o v ef r o m a salaried job to self-employment experience an
additional 3.4 percent annual income loss (on average). It can be argued that this loss is associated
with a transitory decline in income for changing a new job. Nevertheless, the fact that the reverse
transition dummy (i.e. self-employed to salaried) is statistically insigniﬁcant and positive may provide
some evidence that the self-employed will experience long-term losses.25
5.2 Self-Employment: With and Without Employees
Table 8 expands the analysis of Table 5 by distinguishing whether the entry into self-employment takes
place as an own-account work or self-employment with employees. As before, the sample contains all
salaried workers in the ﬁrst period who are still employed one year later. We have already shown
that the transition dynamics of both groups signiﬁcantly diﬀer. Now we estimate a multinomial logit
model in which these two types of entry (with or without employees) are compared to the base category
(remaining salaried). Figure 12.c shows the estimated eﬀect of age and education on the probability of
becoming an own-account worker (left panel) and an entrepreneur with employees (right panel), using
25Unfortunately, the panel data structure of the EPH does not allow us to track individuals for more than one year.
Therefore, transitory and permanent income losses may not be separated. Evidence on this matter shows that individuals
who start a micro-business may have negative proﬁts for the ﬁrst years and only later earn positive gains. The goal of
this sub-section is to rule out the possibility that those entering self-employment actually experience income gains.
19the coeﬃcients from Table 8 (columns 3 and 4 respectively).
Once again, we conﬁrm a clear segmentation. The results observed in Table 5 are only applicable
to one type of entrepreneurs: own-account workers. The left panel of ﬁgure Figure 12.c practically
shows the same segmentation pattern found in the bivariate probit model (compare it with Figure
12.a), which is not so surprising given that the vast majority of self-employed start (and remain) as
own account workers.
However, a uniﬁed pattern exists for entry with employees. In simple words, the likelihood of
becoming an entrepreneur with at least one employee monotonically increases with both education
and age (refer to the right panel). This result is compatible with a dynamic entrepreneurial sector
where successful individuals accumulate enough capital and experience to later try starting their own
business (see Fajnzylber et al., 2006, for details). We also observe remarkable diﬀerences through
those variables used as proxies for unobserved ability: both Wage and Lost Job show opposite signs
depending on whether entry occurs with or without employees, implying that the best salaried workers
are more likely to start a ﬁrm with employees. The number of unemployed individuals who become
entrepreneurs with employees from one period to the another is negligible. Thus, we do not report
multinomial speciﬁcations that distinguish diﬀerent transitions to self-employment (i.e. with and
without employees) from unemployment, but a similar pattern can be obtained in this case.26
To summarize, our econometric results add to the accumulated evidence that link own-account
activities to employment of last resort. Such refuge may either permanent or temporary. A distinction
that respectively characterizes the “misﬁts” or “salaried workers” in the theoretical model. On the
other hand, self-employed with employees closely resemble those who are “pure entrepreneurs.”
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper examines the voluntary nature of the self-employment sector in Argentina in order to
better understand the features of this sector in middle income countries. Because of the extreme
macroeconomic ﬂuctuations that occurred in Argentina in the past 15 years, using data from this
26Results are available on request.
20country allows us to look at multiple business cycle environments over a relatively short span of time.
Our objective is to determine whether this sector is populated by highly motivated individuals with
outstanding entrepreneurial abilities who exit salaried employment to begin their own projects, or
it is stagnant, merely serving as a refuge for the urban unemployed who are unable to ﬁnd salaried
positions.
A key to answering this question is ﬁnding out whether the transition to self-employment is vol-
untary or not. Argentina is a good example to use in measuring the “push” and “pull” factors of the
labor supply because of its distinctly sizable macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.
During recessions, transition into self-employment becomes very common, a trend that reverses
itself in expansionary periods. Results suggest that the vast majority of the self-employed are own
account workers; and if they stay long enough in this sector, most will remain own account. This
ﬁnding supports the pessimistic belief that self-employment is a form of disguised unemployment.
Controlling for skill levels, the self-employed earn much less than salaried workers. Econometric
results also indicate that the longer the unemployment duration the higher the likelihood of becoming
self-employed. They also suggest that the own-account sector maybe characterized as a dual-market.
On one hand, we ﬁnd young individuals with very little education who face structural diﬃculties
to ﬁnding salaried positions, and, regardless of the macroeconomic scenario, are forcedly drawn into
self-employed. On the other hand, we observe middle-age college educated individuals who lose their
employment during recessions and ﬁnd serious obstacles to ﬁnding positions with similar earning and
beneﬁts. In this sense, professional advice and services (somewhat related to their academic training)
are not capital intensive and might be regarded as a safe heaven while waiting for a proper salaried
oﬀer.
When we focus exclusively on those who are self-employed with employees, we ﬁnd the employment
transitions to resemble those of the true entrepreneurs: Recessions are associated with a decline in the
number of individuals that enter this category. People that are currently employed and receive higher
salaries (and thus have more capital), are more likely to become entrepreneurs with employees. The
more experienced and the educated the individual, the higher the likelihood to move into this category.
21Finally, we show that these employment dynamics may be captured by an extended job search model
that includes idiosyncratic entrepreneurial abilities and business cyclical properties.
To conclude, it is hard to reconcile the dynamics of the self-employment sector in Argentina with
those models of voluntary entrepreneurship proposed for industrial countries. The sector is highly seg-
mented and reﬂects contradictory trends. Evidence suggests that policy-makers must be particularly
cautious when extrapolating mainstream models of worker and ﬁrm decision to emerging economies.
If the same policy program is applied uniformly to the whole self-employment sector, the economic
incentives that were designed for a speciﬁc purpose might work improperly. In our understanding, the
existence of entrepreneurs is a necessary condition for the success of a market economy. It is very im-
portant to identify them, provide them supportive policies, ease the access to ﬁnancial resources, and
when necessary, remove institutional regulations that obstruct the entry and expansion of new ﬁrms.
Nonetheless, the self-employment sector is very large and constitutes a source of job precariousness
in emerging economies. Formal and well-paid jobs are usually associated with large ﬁrms that use
risk pooling mechanisms and make better use of technology and capital due to economies of scale.27
Investment in human capital, infrastructure, as well as, sound macroeconomic and welfare policies are
likely more eﬀective than overextended microﬁnance projects. We postpone these issues for future
research.
27For instance, Caputo and Saavedra (2003) show that even workers’ cooperatives largely outperform individual
micro-enterprise projects in Argentina.
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25TABLE 1. BASIC DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 Self-employed  Salaried 




Age  43.0 (11.0)  37.9 (11.5) 
Years of schooling  10.28 (4.40) 10.74  (4.12) 
No Schooling  2.12%  1.79% 
Primary Inc.  9.48%  6.64% 
Primary Comp.  28.14%  24.49% 
High Sch. Inc.  17.47%  16.72% 
High Sch. Comp.  18.40%  20.29% 
Some College  10.02%  17.47% 
College 14.37%  12.60% 
Hourly income*  4.83 (6.92)  4.04 (3.64) 
Hourly income annual growth  -4.77%  -1.86% 
Percentage of household heads  63.4%  51.4% 
Percentage of females  33.2%  41.4% 
    






TABLE 2. SELF-EMPLOYMENT AND SALARIED BY FIRM SIZE 
 
Firm Size  Self-employed  All Salaried  Salaried (non-public 
sector) 
1 65.8%  11.3%  13.5% 
2-5 30.2%  21.0%  23.6% 
6-15 2.8%  17.3%  17.3% 
16-25 0.5%  10.2%  10.1% 
26-50 0.4%  11.9%  11.5% 
51-100 0.2%  10.8%  9.9% 
101-500 0.1%  12.1%  10.2% 
501 and more  0.0%  5.4%  3.9% 
      
Total 100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Notes: Pooled EPH data (1995-2003).  
 
  
TABLE 3. SELF-EMPLOYMENT AND SALARIED BY INDUSTRY 
 
Industry Self-employed Salaried  Total 
Primary sector  1.9%  2.0%  1.9% 
Food, beverage and tobacco 2.4%  3.2%  3.0% 
Textiles, textile products and footwear  2.3%  2.2%  2.2% 
Chemical, ref. petroleum and nuclear fuel  0.4%  1.5%  1.2% 
Metal products, machinery and equipment 2.8%  2.9%  2.8% 
Manufacture not elsewhere classified 3.1%  2.8%  2.9% 
Electricity, gas and water supply  0.1%  1.6%  1.2% 
Construction 16.7%  6.1%  8.9% 
Wholesale trade  4.2%  3.7%  3.9% 
Retail trade  25.5%  8.0%  12.7% 
Restaurants and hotels  2.5%  2.1%  2.2% 
Transportation and related services 5.6%  4.6%  4.9% 
Financial intermediation 0.3%  2.6%  1.9% 
Real estate and rental and leasing  7.7%  3.6%  4.7% 
Public administration and military 0.1%  19.0%  13.9% 
Teaching 1.5%  12.1%  9.3% 
Social services and health  3.3%  7.1%  6.1% 
Other social services  2.0%  4.0%  3.5% 
Repair services  8.1% 1.5% 3.3% 
Households with domestic services 5.5%  8.9%  8.0% 
Other personal services 4.1%  0.7%  1.6% 
      
Total 100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 




TABLE 4.A. SECTOR TRANSITIONS (in %) 
 
To   
Self-Employed Salaried Unemployed  Total 










































TABLE 4.B. FIRM DYNAMICS (in %) 
 
To   
Own-
account 
1 to 4 
employees
5 to 14 
employees

























































































TABLE 5- ENTRY- PROBIT SPECIFICATION 
Dependent Variable: 0= Salaried to Salaried, 1 = Salaried to Self-Employed 
 (1)  (2) 
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Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All 
specifications include time, region and industry dummies. Source EPH. Number of observations: 71,282 TABLE 6. ENTRY- MULTINOMIAL LOGIT SPECIFICATION- 
Dependent variable: 0=Unempl. to Unempl., 1=Unempl. to Self-empl., 2=Unempl.  to Salaried 





























































































Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All 


















TABLE 7. INCOME GROWTH  
Dependent Variable: Hourly Income Growth 





































































































Firm Size (Salaried)         






















































        
Observations 88896  81102  88896  81102 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All 




TABLE 8. ENTRY- MULTINOMIAL LOGIT SPECIFICATION- 
Dependent variable: 0=Salaried to salaried, 1=Salaried to own-account, 2=Salaried to  
Entrepreneur with employees 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
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Firm Size        
























































Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All 
specifications include time, region and industry dummies. Source EPH. Number of observations: 72,221. 
  
FIGURE 1- WORKERS 
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FIGURE 2- BUSINESS CYCLES PROPERTIES 
 
Note: Wage distribution density functions: Black solid (worker perception), Red dotted (recession), Blue dash-
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FIGURE 3 – PURE ENTREPRENEURS 
 
 
FIGURE 4- MISFITS 
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1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
quarter...
GDP Unemployment (in %)
 
Note: Variables expressed in real terms. 
 
FIGURE 6- EVOLUTION OF HOURLY WAGES       




















































1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Year, Wave...
Log Hourly Wage Income growth
 
Note: Pooled EPH data (1995-2003). Variables expressed in real terms.  
 










































































1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
(mean) period ...
Self-employment rate Own-account rate
 






















1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Year, Wave
wrt All SE wrt Own-Account
wrt SE w/employ ees
 
Note: Pooled EPH data (1995-2003). Premiums in levels are obtained as in section 3.1.  
 
 
FIGURE 9- SCHOOLING AND TRANSITION TO SELF-EMPLOYMENT 











































































































1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Year, Wave
Mean Schooling (Sal to SE) Sal to SE
Sal to SE (with employees)
 
Note: Pooled EPH data (1995-2003). SE: self-employed workers, Sal: salaried workers   
 
















































































1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Year, Wave
Mean Schooling (SE to Sal) Proportion SE to Sal
 
Note: Pooled EPH data (1995-2003). SE: self-employed workers, Sal: salaried workers   
 








































































































1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Year, Wave...
Mean Schooling (U to SE) U to SE
U to SE (with employees)
 
Note: Pooled EPH data (1995-2003). SE: self-employed workers, Sal: salaried workers, U: unemployed. 
 
 
EFFECT OF AGE AND EDUCATION ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF ENTRY 
FIGURE 12-A 





























Note: Constructed using the coefficients of Table 5 (Column 2). Horizontal and Vertical axes correspond to Education and Age. The height of 
the box refers to the change in marginal probability.  FIGURE 12-B 
FROM UNEMPLOYMENT INTO SELF-EMPLOYMENT AND SALARIED POSITIONS (MULTINOMIAL LOGIT SPECIFICATION) 
 
 












































Note: Constructed using the coefficients of Table 6 (Column 3 and 4 respectively). See additional notes in Table 5.  
 
FIGURE 12-C 
FROM SALARIED POSITIONS INTO OWN-ACCOUNT AND ENTREPRENEUR WITH EMPLOYEES POSITIONS (MULTINOMIAL LOGIT) 
 











































Notes:  Constructed using the coefficients of Table 8 (Column 3 and 4 respectively). See additional notes in table 5.  
 FIGURE 13 
EFFECT OF UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION IN THE PROBABILITY OF ENTRY INTO SELF-EMPLOYMENT AND SALARIED POSITIONS 
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Note: Constructed using the coefficients of Table 6. Self-Employment (dashed blue), Salaried (solid red).  